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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

BUSINESS ENTERPRISE AND THE PUBLIC UTILITY'S DUTY TO SERVE WITHOUT DISCRIMINATION
By GUSTAVUS H. ROBINSON

S

*

INTRODUCTION

concrete applications of a doctrine may be examined
by simply holding the particular instance up against the
doctrine as a fixed, final, and wholly accepted thing, exercising
the critcal sense merely upon the application. But a serics of
instances leads the examiner to a feeling that the applications furnish a running critique of the doctrine itself. In discrimination
the judicial job is ostensibly to mirror the instant circumstances
against a definitive guiding idea. But much social policy is involved in the presuppositions and it is arguable that reflections
upon them enter into the judicial thought.
Though public utility service nowadays means a large plant
and an overhead for investment and for operation which is not
only heavy but constant, the nondiscrimination theory largely seeks
to standardize the service unit on the requirement of the smaller
user Consequently, it bars, in the utility field, the economic princilple which, in "private" businesses carrying high overhead charge,
decreases the unit charge to the buyer of more units. Underneath
is the inarticulate major premise that there is a social or economic
-- or some like labelled-advantage in keeping up the competitive
capacity of the little man by making the transportation factor in
selling costs substantially equal upon the small-package basis.'
INGLE

*Professor of Law, Boston University Law School, Boston, Mass.
'The only service units recognized in goods transportation are the car
load and the less than carload rates. "Before the act to regulate commerce
it was usual, first to give reduced rates to persons who shipped quantities
of merchandise and, second, to charge a proportionately less rate for a
carload than was asked for a shipment in less than a carload. After the act,
lower rates to wholesale shippers were abandoned, (as) contrary to tie act.
The lesser proportional rate for a carload than for a less than carload was not
prohibited. Thurber v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co., 3 I. C. C. 473, (1890) 2
The theory embodied the assumption that a carload was
I. C. C. 742.
the unit of shipment, and rested upon the differences which existed between
the cost of service in the case of a carload shipment by one consignor to
one consignee, and that occasioned by a shipment i one car of many
packages by various consignors to various consignees." White, C. J. it]
Interstate Commerce Commission v. D. L. & W R. Co., (1911) 220 U S.
235, 31 Sup. Ct. 392, 55 L. Ed. 458.
The train load as a unit is given no concession. In P S. Comm. v. State
ex rel. Gt. Northern Ry. Co., (1922) 118 Wash. 629, 204 Pac. 791. 25
A. L. R. 186, the court said "The commission should not have considered
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The economic principle stated benefits the big concern only in the
use of its own plant. 2 Out of its use of the utility's plant it may
not so benefit, and keeping the little fellow going becomes thus
a means of regulating big business.3
That this solicitude for the smaller may put a premium on
mere conservatism if bigness be due to progressive methods, and
upon inefficiency, when bigness is due to efficiency and to genius
in management, is one of the penalties society pays for its viewpoint. Occasionally a court's sense of these social economies operates to affect the decision. There are cases which countenance
preference of the efficient. 4 On the whole the judicial task is
the fact that the timber company shipped by trainloads, thus tending to
make the cost of transportation less
to charge one furnishing trainload
lots a less rate
is unlawful, because it is in effect 'allowing lower rates
upon a condition which only a few shippers can comply with and. consequently is
an injustice to those unable to ship the required quantity.' Planters' Compress
Co. v. Cleveland C. C. & St. L. R., (1905) 11 1. C. C. 402. 403 Providence
Coal Co. v. Providence & W R., (1887) I. C. C. 363 Anaconda Copper

Min. Co. v. Chicago & E. R., (1910) 19 1. C. C. 592; Burlington C. R. &

N. R. Co. v. Northwestern Fuel Co., (C.C. Minn. 1887) 31 Fed. 652; Watkins, Shippers & Carriers, 3d. ed., sec. 159."
Passenger transportation shows some curiously involved recognitions
of the wholesale-retail principle; in party rates, Interstate Commerce Conmission v. Baltimore & 0. R. R., (1892) 145 U. S.263, 12 Sup. Ct. 844. 36
L. Ed. 699; constant use of the road by commuters. Pennsylvania R. R. v.
Towers, (1917) 245 U. S.6, 38 Sup. Ct. 2, 62 L Ed. 117 though there is
no commutation rate to a constant user for freight purposes- mileage books
United States v. New York Central R. R, (1924) 263 U. S. 603, 44 Sup.
Ct. 212, 68 L. Ed. 470.
This non-application of the wholesale-retail principle has not been so
rigorous as to utilities not selling transportation. See Silkman v. Water
Commissioners, (1897) 152 N. Y. 327 46 N. E. 612, 37 A. L. R. 827 Walton
v. Proutt, (1915) 117 Ark. 388, 174 S.W 1152, L. R. A. 1915D 917 As
between commercial and household users, it is more understandable than as
between
commercial users merely.
2
J. J. Jackson in "The High Cost of Selling," New Republic July 25.
1928, points out how as respects highly competitive articles, particularly
automobiles, the selling charges deprive the consumer of the benefit of the
lower production costs. Utility sales are subject to no such selling costs
as the products are by the utility hypothesis self-selling.
3
Mark Sullivan shows that the great activity in the public fight for
non-discrimination coincided with the "trust busting" era see his "Our
Times: America Finding Herself," Chapter 15. See also John Moody. "The
Railroad Builders" (Chronicles of America) 1921, p. 230. In 1904 Bruce
Wyman published a long article on "The Law of the Public Callings as a
Solution of the Trust Problem," 17 Harv. L. Rev. 156, 217
4
The duty to be efficient is imposed of course on the utility" "We must
concede that it is not only the right but the duty of the public utility to discard inconvenient or obsolete apparatus and provide the best available."
State v. Sunset Tel. & Tel. Co., (1915) 86 Wash. 309, 150 Pac. 427
And there are similar duties on the user of the utility. In Baltimore
& 0. R. R. Co. v. Pullman Service Comm., (1917) 81 W Va. 457 94 S. E.
545, a preference in the type of cars allotted to mines which operated
against those not owning tipples for loading was sustained.

106
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difficult in the principle. Besides barring the wholesale-retail idea,
the doctrine of equality treatment also bars business practices
which are "good business" both in trade and in law outside the
utility field. Yet there is a social interest in enterprise in business
as itself a thing to be fostered, and undesirabilities in business
need not now be fought by the use of the public utility law premises so much as previously, since government regulation has so
largely entered into all forms of business.
In addition to these
considerations the task is no less difficult in practice than in principle and, indeed, without the commissions, mandated to deal with
the fact situations as individual problems primarily 0 it would be
"Their own lack of proper equipment is a just and reasonable ground
of discrimination against them when conditions are such as to make an extension of equality of facilities to them highly injurious to others and restrictive of the efficiency of the carriers."
In Atchison, T. & S. F R. Co. v. United States, (1914) 232 U. S. 199,
34 Sup. St. 291, 58 L. Ed. 568, a dispute over precooling or Icing enroute,
the court said, "Neither party has a right to insist upon a wasteful or
expensive service for which the consumer must ultimately pay." The "dry
ice" discoveries of the last year or two which tend to revolutionize car
refrigeratioi. methods may shortly make this last problem a real one.
51
n a recent article, "Administrative Commissions and the Adniinstration of Justice" in (1928) 2 Univ. Cincinnati L. Rev. 1, H. L. levis
at page 6 et seq., shows the amount of regulation of the "private" business.
See also "Social Control of Business." J. M. Clark (1926)
reviewed
(1927) 13 St. Louis L. Rev. 33.
6
"Why is a Commission?" has been answered practically. Briefly it is
because the legislature cannot do the job, and the job must be done "There
are in this state approximately 450 gaslight and electric-light companies.
They are located in nearly every portion of the state, which contains within
its bounds not only cities varying in population from 10,000 to 4,000.000.
but villages, agricultural or rural communities, and the wild forests of the
Adirondacks. It is plain that no uniform rate of charges could be established that would be just or reasonable. Besides, the difference in the output of the several companies varying with the size of the communities they
respectively supply as well as the difference in the cost of material to the
various companies, dependent on their location with reference to the cost
of transportation of coal, oil, and the like, would make a rate that was
fair in one place unreasonable in another. Therefore, any close approx,
mation to a reasonable tariff would require special rates to be prescribed
for many different localities. To do this properly would involve an investigation into the particular facts in each case. There was a time In
the history of this country when carriers and public-service corporations
were so few that the legislature itself might have performed that labor but.
by reason of the rapid growth of population and the great increase in the
number of such corporations, it has become impracticable for the legislature to discharge that duty. Moreover, many rates may require alteration
from time to time. That the most appropriate method (speaking from a
practical, not necessarily constitutional, point of view) is the creation of a
commission or body of experts to determine the particular rates, has been
said several times in the opinions rendered by the Supreme Court of the
United States in the various railroad-commission cases and in those of state
courts.
"It would be also impossible for the Legislature of this state to
undertake intelligent regulation of utility corporations by the Legislature
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impossible. Effective direct handling by courts of modern utility
regulation is an unthinkable thing.
THE RECENT CASES

Although the general duty of a public utility to deal with
its customers on a basis of equality is not now open to contestand the battle just now is on the duty to serve at reasonable rates,'
itself."

Cullen C. J. in Trustees of Saratoga Springs v. Saratoga Gas. etc.,

Co., (1908) 191 N. Y. 123, 83 N. E. 693. To the same effect is Idaho Power
and Light Co. v. Blomquist, (1914) 26 Ida. 2222, 141 Pac. 1083.
Chief Justice Taft, in his response to the resolutions of the Bar in cornmemoration of Chief Justice White says:
"The Interstate Commerce Commission was authorized to exercise
powers the conferring of which by Congress would have been perhaps.
thought in the earlier years of the Republic to violate the rule that no
legislative power can be delegated. But the inevitable progress and exigencies of government and the utter inability of Congress to give the time and
attention indispensable to the exercise of these powers in detail force the
modification of the rule. Similar necessity caused Congress to create other
bodies with analogous relations to the existing legislative, executive, and
judicial machinery of the federal government, and these in due course came
under the examination of this court. Here was a new field of administrative law which needed a knowledge of government and an experienced
understanding of our institutions safely to define and declare. The pioneer
work of Chief Justice White in this field entitles him to the gratitude ot
his countrymen." 257 U. S. XXV-VI.
-The somewhat unprofitable debate as to whether the common law did
or did not require service without discrimination is discussed pro and con
in the cases of Sullivan v. Minneapolis & R. R. Rv., (1913) 121 Minn. 488, 142
N. W 3, 45 L. R. A. (N.S.) 612, and earlier in Interstate Comn. Comm.
v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., (1892) 145 .U. S. 263, 12 Sup. Ct. 844. 36 L Ed.
699. They concluded that the weight of common law authority favored the
duty. Modern public utility statutes impose it, under varying phraseology
and under scrutiny as to details by administrative agencies, and the statutes
are so far universal (only Delaware does not have one), that the duty is
no longer debatable as a practical thing.
In Akron, Canton, etc.. Ry. v. United States (New England Division
Case), (1923) 261 U. S. 184, 43 Sup. Ct. 270, 67 L. Ed. 605. Brandeis. J.
treats it as a thing established. "Transportation Act of 1920 introduced
into the federal legislation a new railroad policy. Theretofore, the effort of
Congress had been directed maminlv at the prevention of abuses: particu'arlv
those arising from excessive or discriminatory rates. The 1920 Act sought
to insure also adequate transportation service." See also Taft C. J. in The
Wisconsin Passenger Fares Case, (1923) 257 U. S. 563. 42 Sup. Ct. 232. 66
L. Ed. 347 The Uniform Public Utilities Act tentatively adopted hv the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1927 by
section 6 bars "any unreasonable preference," the commission to determine
"any question of fact arising."
sIn the now famous "biggest lawsuit in history" involving the valuation theory to be applied to the railroads, "Excess Income of St. Louis and
O'Fallon Ry. Co.," (1927) 124 I. C. C. I.. Mr. Eastman C.. concurring
with the majority, says of the commission's job, p. 50, "In determining
questions, knowledge of pertinent facts and an experience which makes
possible to visualize the probable results of a particular public policy are
quite as important as familiarity with the law books. It is an instance
in which the law is influenced if not governed by the facts. When, there-
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the discrimination case is far from a rarity Vigilant enforcement
is needed to make "law in action" of the law now in the books.
As it is, so subtly is the discriminatory situation brought
about, and so fortified, frequently, by otherwise accepted commercial enterprise, that the solutions seem in many instances
mere opportunism. The matter in hand often appears "settled"
only in the sense that authority has spoken and consequently furnished a guide to which the contesting parties may now adapt
their dealings.
One of the preliminary tasks in enforcing the obligations of
a utility to its public is to delimit the extent of the duties. Often
a controversial matter in itself,9 it complicates the discrimination
cases because, under the utility acts, the customer may do some
of the things which the law requires the utility to do, and make
claim on the utility for payment. 10 Obviously his investment in
special equipment is actuated by the urge to secure a business advantage, and a strictly logical theory might bar either his doing
these things, or his being paid for doing them. But no doubt
there is sufficient economy in the present practice to justify it
since it spurs to progress in methods. 1 As it stands, however it
fore, the question relates to the constitutional limits of the public regulation of railroads, an intimate knowledge of railroads, of their relations
with and their importance to the shipping and investing classes and to
the public generally, and of their past history and future prospects becomes
of the highest consequence. Such knowledge it is the peculiar duty of tils
commission to acquire. As to such matters it occupies a daily front seat
upon the stage, while the Supreme Court of necessity is only an occasional
visitor in the balcony
"I can not avoid the conclusion that the commission would be derelict iii
its duty in this case if it should
neglect the illumination which is
thrown upon the law by its own intimate knowledge of transportation
affairs and problems."
He and the majority went so far in his theory as to take a view
opposed to the "spot reproduction cost" of the Supreme Court in Indianapolis Water Co. v. McCardle, (1926) 272 U. S. 400, 47 Sup. Ct. 144.
71 L. Ed. 316. Hearing on the appeal from an affirmance of the Conimissions results in (1928) 22 F (2d) 980, Distr. Ct. E. D. Mo. 1927 has
been set by the Supreme Court for January 2, 1929.
See note 5 ante. The writer's "Reasonable Rates the Valuation War,"
6 N. C. L. Rev. 243 is a purely expository article, which, however, collects
the controversial
literature.
9
N. Y. Cent. & H. R. R. v. Cent. Elec. Co., (1916) 219 N. Y 227
114 N. E. 115, 1 A. L. R. 1417 Cardozo J. "The decisive question must
therefore be whether the switching done by the defendant within its plant
between its storage tracks and the platforms of its mills is work which
the plaintiff, (RR) was bound to do as part of transportation
To put
it in another form the question is, where does transportation begin and end ?"
"'The provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act are in section 15 (13)
"See note 4 ante.
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is necessarily under close scrutiny in the interest of the nondiscrimination policy. 12
(a) ALLOWANCES TO UTILITY CUSTOM
One of the cases involving these allowances, which particularly invites reflection on the disadvantages to which the nondiscrimination theory may subject those who apply new efficiencies
to old problems, is Alex Sprunt and Son v. United States. 3 Cotton which is collected at interior points where it is lightly coinpressed, goes to Houston, Texas, where, if it is for export, it is
very tightly compressed. Cotton for local delivery in Houston
moved at a rate of 80 cents. Cotton for export moved at 85 cents,
"making a spread between domestic and export rates of 3.5 cents,
cost of transferring cotton from
this difference representing
the city compresses and warehouses back to the waterfront
to shipside."
The uptown facilities could bring their cotton in at 80 cents,
and, after compressing it, declare it for export, when the railroads would carry it to the port for an additional 31/., cents. They
usually preferred to dray their cotton to shipside, themselves. In
either event, to get their cotton to shipside from the interior, would
cost about 83.5 cents. The distance varied from one to five miles.
All the Houston compresses were back from the water until
the Sprunts upset the equilibrium of advantage by "the erecting
of large warehouses, with compresses, on the water front" and
were able to deliver directly to shipside. Thus "These warehouses by using the domestic rate of 80 cents can get their cotcents cheaper than the in3
ton within reach of shipside
tenor and uptown facilities."
At the latter's instance the Commerce Commission consequently declared the two-rate plan unduly preferential of the
waterfront plants, and it set a single rate of 81 cents. But it
spoiled the smooth symmetry of this arrangement by saying- "We
see no reason for condemning a reasonable allowance for dray12There are many cases besides the N. Y. Central, etc. R. R. v. Cent.

Elec. Co., (1916) 219 N. Y. 227 114 N. E. 115, 1 A. L. R. 1417

See

also on the same topic of industrial plant railway switding. Crane Iron
Works v. Cent. R. R. of N. J., (Commerce Ct. 1912) 209 Fed. 238 and

note in 27 Harv. L. Rev. 579. On elevator allowances, see Interstate Commerce Commission v. Diffenbaugh, (1911) 222 U. S. 42, 32 Sup. Ct.
22, 56 L. Ed. 83, and note in 25 Harv. L. Rev. 456. On loading and
unloading, see Atch. T. & S. F R. Co. v. United States, (1914) 232 U. S.
L. Rev. 48.
199, 34 Sup. Ct. 291, 58 L. Ed. 568, note in 9 Ill.

13(D. C. Tex. 1927) 23 F (2d) 874.
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iug from uptown
such
being a substitute for rail transportation," and unpalatably for the waterside compresses, added
"But upon cotton delivered to shipside from and by water front
warehouses
the hand or electric trucking or movement by
overhead trolley
to that part known as the wharf, is not a
substitute for rail transportation, but is an intraplant movement,
just the same as the handling of cotton from the interior of an uptown warehouse to the railroad car or dray is an intraplant movement. No allowances may lawfully be made."
This satisfied nobody
Shippers who had enjoyed an 80
cent rate joined carriers who had had an 85 cent figure in objecting to the 81 cent rate, and the Sprunts of course repelled the
fateful label "intraplant." Yet all failed in the effort to enjoin
the enforcement of the order
Sprunt's argument that the order did not in fact establish
a one rate plan, but a plurality of rates whereby the disadvantageously located were equalized with them gave the court much
difficulty, but it reached the conclusion
"That
if attention is fixed upon the movement by the
carrier the difficulties of the case will disappear
if the
water front warehouses can have cotton delivered to their own
plant facilities by which they can put the cotton to shipside it is no
concern of theirs that an uptown warehouse gets its cotton to shipside at the same transportation cost. That the fact that the water
front warehouses have spent money to get their sites, and made
expenditures upon intraplant equipment is no matter to be considered in rates.
In short, that they have contributed nothing
to transportation as such in building where they did and in eqtupping their plants as they have."
Does this provide an adequate answer to the Sprunts' argument "that if such ruling stands, plaintiffs and those similarly
situated had better sell out, move back from the water front, and
thus put themselves in a position of equality with their uptown
competitors"'United States v Spencer Kellogg and Sons'4 is another phase
of the allowance problem. Elevator concerns located in Buffalo
who received grain from Great Lakes vessels and loaded it upon
cars, received for this under the rail carriers field rates, one cent
per bushel and gave the consignees"5 one-half cent. The business
14(D.C.N.Y. 1926) 12 F (2d) 612.
15The elevator men had previously sued the carrier involved (Kellogg
& Sons v. Delaware L. & W Co., (1922) 204 App. Div. 243, 197 N. Y S.
380) for the I cent per bushel, which the railroad company refused to
pay because the Kellogg concern had agreed to pay the rebates here in
question, contending that, if it did so, it would subject itself to puiushment under the Elkins Act. Of this the court remarked "The civil
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purpose, of course, was to divert the grain stream so as to run
through the particular elevator. This "split" is the device to
rebate relied upon under the Elkins Act. Demurrers to the indictments were overruled in the district court where the elevator
men "contended that (they) are not common carriers or agents
of the railroads transporting the grain, or persons acting for them
that they acted in their own interests,
in giving refunds
unconnected with any arrangement with the railroad
carriers, and accordingly that the Elkms Act does not apply"
Said Hazel, D. J.
"The Elkins Act cannot thus be narrowly construed. It was
not essential that the rebate should have been. paid out of the
rate or funds of the carriers
or pursuant to a common
understanding between them and the carriers. It makes no difference that defendants were not common carriers, or that they acted
independently throughout in parting with their money to the shippers. The Elkins Act is not so impotent as to allow persons or
corporations, aside from common carriers, to thwart (itself)
by a device of any sort which results in a shipper paying
less rate for the carnage than a lavful rate."
In affirming, the circuit court of appeals, second circuit,ie
said
"The law was intended to reach (those) who contribute
knowingly and understandingly to a rebate or concession by any
manner or device,'" and the relation which the culprit bore to the
liability imposed by that decision did not determine the criminal responsibility. The penalty is imposed here, not because it was acting for the
carrier, but because it performed a service of transportation, and gave
a rebate to its shipper or consignee from the compensation received for that
part which it performed."
The New York court had expressed the opinion that there was no
violation of the discrimination policy by the elevator men. But it based
itself on section 2 of the Commerce Act which, the federal court pointed
out, is narrower in scope than the Elkins Act.
16(C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1927) 20 F (2d) 459. It is noted in 28 Columbia
L. Rev. 507 on the point that there was no "common control" except
that the water carrier-elevator-rail-carrier participated in the through
rate. The order considers the latter to be sufficient, however. On this the
court simply said that the Spencer Kellogg concern "inusing its elevator
for transportation
effectuated the through movement of interstate
shipments."
"7"In Union Pacific R. R. v. Updike Grain Co., (1911) 222 U. S.
215, 32 Sup. Ct. 39, 56 L. Ed. 171, referred to," said the court, "it was
held that a railroad may not pay an allowance to one shipper and refuse
an allowance to another, when both shippers have rendered the same
service to the railroad company.
This authority does not aid plaiitiff in error's present position. Nor does Interstate Commerce Commission v. Diffenbaugh, (1911) 222 U. S.42, 32 Sup. CL 22, 56 L. Ed. 83.
for there it was held that, when a shipper performs transportation service which it is the legal duty of the carrier to perform, it is entitled
to reasonable compensation for the performance of that service. The
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carrier is not necessary as a foundation upon which to rest responsibility ",'
(b)

CUSTOMERS' CONTRACTS

WITH TIlE UTILITY

Equality treatment in the allotment of equipment among
applicants breeds, on the carrier side, much litigation, which runs
basically to the question "Just how many cars should the carrier
have?", and which remains a puzzle unsolved. Theoretically, perhaps, there should be no difficulty "A carrier is only required
to have a car supply adequate to meet the normal demands of the
trade."' 9 But what is "normal " So long as the graph representing demands runs to peaks and sags2" a balancing of the interests involved would seem to place the numerical requirement at
a figure represented by a line cutting across the graph below the
highest peaks and above the lowest sags, and, though there is
judicial pronouncement" which draws the line through the peaks,
elevator owner, in that case, was the shipper, and it elevated its own
grain.5 It differs in that material fact from the case at bar."
' Certiorari was denied, (1927), 275 U. S. 566, 48 Sup. Ct. 122.
19In Illinois Central R. R. v. River Rail Coal and Coke Co.. (1912)
150 Ky. 489, 150 S. W 641, the Kentucky court states truly enough
"If the slack as well as the busy months of the year are to be taken
into consideration in estimating the equipment needed, the supply of
cars might be wholly inadequate during the busy months, and yet there
But it then naively
would be a large surplus during the slack months."
draws as a "normal" a line through the peaks of the graph "conceding
that a carrier is only required to have a car supply adequate to meet
the normal demands of the trade, this normal demand is not to be
estimated by the number of cars needed when the normal demand is
least, but by the number needed when the normal demand is the heaviest,
in respect to a commodity such as coal, the normal demand for which
And
is practically the same during six or eight months in each year.
while the number needed in each of these busy months may be taken
into consideration in estimating the number needed to supply the demand during all these months, the number needed to supply the demand during the spring and summer months is entitled to little consideration in determining what number of cars is needed to supply the
demand."
normal
0
2 The straphanger of the urban rush hour, the commuter, the moveThe fluidity resulting
ment of coal, of wheat, etc., are the problems.
from nationwide operation enables the Pullman Company to shift equipand
ment north to south and vice versa according to seasonal traffic
the efforts of the car interchange association effectuate a somewhat
similar result. Since the "rush hour" concerns not only cars but track
One solucapacity, "a seat for every passenger" seems impossible.
tion offered is to take the rush out of the hour by the stagger systemRecent surveys of
i. e., spreading the traffic over a wider time area.
An intelligent cooperation by
urban automobile traffic recommend this.
the traveling public with the utilities is too much to be hoped for so
long as urban politicians make their most effective politics out of
attacking local transportation companies.
21See note 19.
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the elaborate provisions which regulation makes for car distribution invite the assertion that the balance indicated is more or less
the working compromse.2 2 Consequently the occasions when the
demand and supply graphs do not coincide present invitations to
the shipper to do something for himself.
Freest freedom of contract being until lately part of our
inbred thinking,23 he naturally sought by making arrangement
with the utility as he would with any other seller to secure a special claim upon the carrier. But to this the nondiscrimination
doctrine interposes a most resolute veto.2 4 Under prevailing
views it operates to withdraw utility service and utility rates from
the field of contract.
Notwithstanding the prevalent authority, South Carolina, in
a recent three to two decision, Strock v. Southern Ry.2 ' yielded
to the business argument and supported a contract whereby a logging concern was to have placed at "Station Fifty-eight" each
Monday, from May to October, two cars for loading with lumber
which the shipper cut nearby during the week and piled up in
the railroad yard.26 The complaint simply recited that the logs
22
"This obligation includes the obvious duty to keep for use such
rolling stock as the requirements of ordinary business make necessary,
but not the duty to keep extra rolling stock to meet extraordinary or
unprecedented requirements." Cathron J.. in Strock v. Southern Ry.,
(1927) 143 S. C. 207, 140 S. E. 470. The phrase "extraordinary or unprecedented," though part of the judicial jargon of car shortage, furnishes no
real help in the situations, however, where the seasonal or diurnal peak
is constant and foreseeable.
The Interstate Commerce Act sec. 1 par. 12 recognizes the car
shortages as a condition to be met. It requires the carrier to make distribution of coal cars on mine ratings, under the supervision of the Commerce Commission, and the latter, by paragraph 15, is empowered to
make23emergency distribution.
Roscoe Pound discusses this in various writings. See his article,
"Liberty of Contract" 18 Yale L J. 454 and his books, "Spirit of the
Common
Law" p. 28, and "Introduction to a Philosophy of Law," p. 265.
24
-The broad purpose of the Commerce Act was to compel the establishment of reasonable rates and their uniform application. That purpose would be defeated if sanction be given to a special contract Iv
which any such advantage is given to a particular shipper," says Lurton
J. in Chicago and Alton R. R. v. Kirby, (1912) 225 U. S. 155, 32 Sup.
Ct. 648, 56 L Ed. 1033. "The price (of service) is no longer a matter
the rate
by law esof private contract between the parties
tablished and not the acts or contracts of the parties must control "
Pollock, D. J. in Atchison T. S. F R. Co. v. Kinkade, (D.C. Kans. 1916)
203 Fed. 165. See a note on the free contract doctrine, versus utility
service in 41 Harv. L. Rev. 1069. A late discussion is by J. R. Anthony
in 6 Texas L. Rev. 266, "The attitude of the Supreme Court toward
Liberty of Contract," 285.
25 (1927) 142 S. C. 207, 140 S. E. 470- noted, 41 Harv. L. Rev. 1069.
There is nothing in the case to indicate that there was any car shortage, it is true.
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were going "to market"-which the court promptly assumed was
7

in South CarolinaY

Reading the South Carolina Act the court said, per Carter J..
could be construed 'to
"I do not think such a contract
allow or receive any rebate, drawback or other advantage', neither
does the contract give a preference to the particular shipper, nor
does it discriminate against others."
Developing the business argument, he continued
"The recognition of the right of a shipper to make (the)
is but the recognition of an orderly way of trancontract
saction of business. It enables the owner of property to know
when to engage laborers for the purpose of assembling his property for shipment, and further enables him not only to make contracts with laborers in a businesslike manner, but it enables him
to make contracts with parties at a distance for the sale and delivwith some degree of certainty Take this right away
ery
and you, to a great extent, deprive the shipper of a market
and thereby indirectly destroy his property, discourage the producSuch a right certion of property, and paralyze business.
tainly does no injury to the common carrier, but, on the other hand,
it enables the carrier to better plan to serve the public, build up
business, and thereby increase its revenue. In what way does

2
"The railroad so bunched the cars that the shipper's force could
not load them in time to avoid demurrage charges, making his costs
higher than those of his competitors, and, he said, "thus discriminating
against (him), and at the same time cheating him and defrauding him
out of the amount of the demurrage." The demurrage was $26.00. Apparently the shipments went on through the season. The whole transac
tion seems modest enough financially speaking; but ad damnum was
set at $10,000.
271f the haul was intrastate the theory of the railroad's demurrer
was that the "contract" violated the state statutes barring "preferences.
discrimination and undue advantages-" if interstate the road stood on
the Federal rules and decisions.
Said the court "I concede, under the authority of Davis v. Cornwell, (1924) 264 U. S; 560, 44 Sup. Ct. 410, 68 L. Ed. 848, that a shipper
cannot recover damages caused by the common carrier failing to fur
nish cars at a specified time and place -if the shipper relies solely on
an express contract with the common carrier to furnish cars at a speDavis v. Corncified time and place for an interstate shipment.
well, supra, does not preclude the shipper from, recovering where, the
shipment is interstate commerce, if there is a, lack of due diligence
and it would be competent, further, to prove the contract for the pur-pose of showing that the -carrier had received notice that the shipper
desired cars at the time and place named or as evidence that the coinmon carrier had -not made reasonable effort to supply the cars, it being
the obligation of the common carrier, implied in the tariff, to use diligence to provide, upon reasonable notice, cars for loading at the time
desired, as set forth under the foregoing mentioned decision."
He thus confines the effect of the illegality to judicial non-assistance toward the enforcement of the contract. In his view the illegality
does not deprive the shipper of judicial assistance upon the transaction
generally. See however the writer's "The filed rate policy." in 77 U.
of Pa. L. Rev. 213. 222.
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such a right discriminate against the public? All shippers have the
same right to contract for cars, they are all on an equal footing,
and such a right and system simply enables the common carrier to
handle its business in an orderly way."28
Thus the immediate business interests involved turn the case.
It illustrates how sharply they are sacrificed under the federal
view which gives the "contract" no standing in court.
Concerning a filed rate policy " the opinion says nothing, dealing with the case under local legislation which corresponds to section 3 of the Interstate Commerce Act. The later federal cases, it is
true, discuss chiefly the filed rate policy contained in section 6.31
But it is not arguable that the national decisions base merely on
that section. In Chicago and Alton R. R. v. Kirb ,31 after quoting both, the court says "for breach of such a contract relief
will be denied because its allowance without such publication (in
the tariff) is a violation of the act. It is also illegal because it
is an undue advantage."
It is an "undue advantage," however, only if the shipper
profits under it. Where he does not get what he arranged for
-8Two judges took the view that whether interstate or intrastate
commerce was involved the contracts offended the applicable laws. The
note in 41 Harv. L. Rev. 1069, considers the decision questionable if a
state matter, wrong if an interstate.
In Kansas the rule of the federal courts was applied to the local
statute in Mollahan v. Atchison, T. S. F R., (1916) 97 Kan. 51, 154 Pac.
248, L. R. A. 1918A 175, noted in 14 Mich. L. Rev. 416.
29If the policy of the state does allow a shipper an assurance of
car quantum it would seem that the assured service should be specifically provided for in the tariff.
3OThIs -is true in Davis v. Cornwell where the invalidity of the
"contract" threw the shipper plaintiff out of court; and also true in
Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Westinghouse, etc., Co., (1926) 270 U. S.
260, 46 Sup. Ct. 220, 70 L. Ed. 576, where it threw the carrier out.
.iilt denied damages for the breach of a special contract for expedited service to a junction point at which Kirby's horses were to be
put on a horse special of a connecting road at a set date. There was
no tariff covering this, and Kirby paid only the rate filed for nonassured connection.
In Copper River Packing Co. v. Alaska S. S. Co., (C.C.A. 9th Cir.
1927) 22 F (2d) 12, federal atithority however sustained an arrangement 'for ship space which was entirely similar as a business provision
on the shipper's part to that of the 4ogging concern in the South Carolina case, except in so far as the vagueness of the provisions which the
circumstances necessarily impelled may put--it iii a more favorable light.
Sincez the Southern is -a large interstate carrier it was argued that
therefore car distribution was a federal and not a state matter. This
point the court did not discuss at all. Intrastate appropriation of
equipment may easily upset the balances in favor of interstate traffic
which the policy of the 1920 act has been consistently building up.
This jealous guardianship of the railroads as a single agency for
nation-wide service is developed by the author in "Interacting Areas
of Regulatory Authority in Public Utilities," 76 .U. Pa. L. Rev. 394.
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and gets no damages for not getting it the nondiscrimination
policy is completely vindicated, so far as the civil side is conicerned. But what if the customer has actually received the advantage "contracted" for and the carrier is in court seeking payment for it?

In Chesapeake and Ohio Ry. Co. v. West nghouse-Kerr
Co., 3 2 the railway was unable to "spot" cars of material consigned

to a building concern. "To remedy the condition the engine and
crew were assigned to the exclusive use of its traffic, l)ayment
to be made therefor as prescribed in the contract." When the
carrier sued to recover over $13,000 "for the use of the engine
and crew rented," the court said, per Brandeis J.
"
abnormal conditions may relieve a carrier from liability
for failure to perform the usual transportation services, but they
do not justify an extra charge for performing them. The carrier
is here seeking compensation in excess of the tariff rate3 3 for
having performed a service covered by the tariff. This is expressly
prohibited by the Interstate Commerce Act sec. 6. A contract to
pay this additional amount is both without consideration and illegal.
To so insure performance to a shipper was an undue preference. Hence the contract would be equally void for illegality on
this ground."3 4
Recovery was denied.
Thus the customer not only got what was a preference
whether or not he paid for it, but he does not pay for the advantage he got. The case presented such a dilemma as mechanical
jurisprudence breeds. The filed rate theory, which is a distinct
contribution to easy administration in a mechanical way of the
nondiscrimination policy,3" sometimes makes "John Doe suffer for
the good of the Commonwealth," from the blunders of the utility
in quoting figures in reliance on which he irrevocably concludes
business dealings which his later required payment of the filed
rate turns into loss." The Westinghouse-Kerr Case maintains
the symmetry of its mechanical application at the expense of the
policy it was designed to vindicate. Surely the end should be
more important than the means to the end.
32(1926) 270 U. S. 260, 46 Sup. Ct. 220, 70 L. Ed. 576.
33Obviously, no quantum meruit claim would be entertained if the
objection is not merely to recovery on the contract but to a recovery
in excess of the tariff.
34Davis v. Cornwell, (1924) 264 U. S. 560, 44 Sup. Ct. 410, 68 L.
Ed. 848.
35
See the writers, "The filed rate theory a phase of mechanical
jurisprudence," as cited in note 27
36
The cases are cited in the article mentioned in note 35.
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It would more accurately comport with the objective of the
law to confine judicial blindness to the contract to cases where
nothing has been accomplished under it. In instances like the
present the same ultimate end would be better served in most
cases by enforcing the contract as made and rigorously applying
the criminal provisions against the violations of the nondiscnmination doctrine. The "most cases" is added because of the possibility that the large sized seeker of preference might, in buying
it, find it worth while simply to add his own and the carrier's
fines to the purchase cost. "Good business" constantly wars with
the inarticulate major premise.
(c) PRIVATE CAR OWNERSHIP AS A BUSINESS POLICY

Accepting, however, that the business man is barred from
taking self protective measures to cover his car requirements by
"contract," and since the distribution is obviously not to be entrusted to the carrier, the same public interest that blocks them
out of the field drives the regulatory authority into it. As in
other instances where society denies self-help, it must cover the
situation by its own direct action. Consequently, as Mr. Justice
Brandeis remarked in Lambert Run Coal Co. v. Baltimore and
Ohio R. R. Co. -3
"The distribution of coal cars in times of car shortage has
received much attention.
Definite rules for distribution were promulgated by the [Commerce] Commission, and they
remained in force for many years. Among these was the socalled assigned car rule declared by the Commission in Railroad
Commission v. Hocking Valley Ry. Co., 12 I. C. C. 398, and Traer
v. Clucago and Alton R. R. Co., (1910) 215 U. S. 452, 30 Sup.
Ct. 155," 54 L. Ed.280.B
Recently the subject was called up again in so far as car

allotment is affected by car ownership. Good business, no doubt,
37(1922) 258 U. S. 377 42 Sup. Ct. 349, 66 L Ed. 671.
SSHe says, "That practice approved in Traer v. Chicago & Alton
R. R., (1910) 215 U. S.452, 30 Sup. Ct. 155, 54 L. Ed. 280, which became -known as the Hocking Valley-Traer rule, was later adopted.
either voluntarily or pursuant to orders of the Commission, by other
carriers. So far as concerned private cars, the rule was, in substance.
adopted, during federal control, by the Railroad Administration. Car
Service Circular 31-effective December 23, 1919. Upon the termination of federal control, the Commission issued a notice to carriers and
shippers (dated March 2, 1920). It recommended that the Hocking
Valley-Traer rule be applied by the carriers also to railroad fuel cars.
But no uniform rule concerning assigned cars applicable to all carriers
had been prescribed by the Commission until the entry of the order
here complained of; and much diversity in practice existed." Assigned
Car Cases, (1927) 274 'U. S. 564, 570, 47 Sup. Ct. 727 71 L. Ed. 1204.
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impels those especially dependent upon transportation to invest
in cars, but the value of the investment is lessened by the application of the nondiscrimination rule in The Assigned Car Cases
(United States v Berwind-White Coal & Mining Co., and nine
others) 39 in which the court reversed a district court of three
judges.

40

The district court had upset a rule of the Commission which
Mr. Justice Brandeis describes as follows
"The operation may be illustrated by the following example
Assume that there are in the district 10 mines each with the rating,
or capacity, of 20 cars a day, and that of the 200 cars needed to
fill the district's requirements only 100 cars are available on a
particular day, and that of the 100 only 85 are owned by the railroad, the remaining 15 being owned by mine A. Under the rule,
the share of each mine would be ten cars. Mine A would be permitted to have placed its own cars, but only 10 of them. If, on the
other hand, 95 of the 100 cars had been owned by the carrier, and
only 5 by mine A, there would be placed at its mine, in addition
to
4
its own 5 cars, 5 of the carrier's so-called system cars." '
"The order here assailed differs from the Hocking ValleyTraer rule (supra) in two respects. Under the Hocking ValleyTraer rule the carrier was permitted to place at a mine all the
39(1927) 274 U. S. 564, 47 Sup. Ct. 727, 71 L. Ed. 1204. It explained
that. "The term 'assigned cars' is used in contradistinction to system
cars. By assigned cars are meant those placed for use at a specified
mine for a particular shipper. By system cars are meant those, from
time to time on the line, which are being kept available for use at any
mine for any shipper. Assigned cars are of two classes. One class of
assigned cars consists of private cars. These are cars owned (or
leased) by some shipper (or subject to the control of a particular per
son not a rail carrier) who delivers them to the railroad for placement
at designated mines for loading and transportation as desired by the
owner of the cars. Assigned cars of the other class are called railroad
fuel cars. These consist wholly of cars owned (or leased) by some
carrier, which, instead of being left, like system cars, for use indiscriminately in carrying coal from any mine for any consignor to any consignee, are assigned to a particular mine to carry coal to be used as
fuel by
a particular carrier."
40(D.C.Pa. 1925) 9 F (2d) 429.
41Soothingly-if paradoxically-he adds "The rule does not divert
the surplus of cars owned by one shipper to use by another. It merely
puts a restriction upon the use of the private car by limiting the number of the so-called assigned cars which may be placed at a particular
mine at a particular time. The owner may use the surplus elsewhere
or he may lease the surplus cars to the carrier or to another shipper.
The operation of the rule upon assigned railroad fuel cars is precisely
similar. The limitation is imposed in order to improve the service and
to prevent any mine (including one operated by a railroad) from securing at the particular time, more than its ratable share of the aggregate available coal transportation facilities." Would the owner be allowed not to lease his cars so that they would stand idle when cars
were needed? Or would he not be required to turn them into the car
pool ?
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cars (whether private or railway fuel cars) which had been assigned to it, even if the number assigned exceeded its pro rata of
all available cars. The prohibition formerly imposed was merely
upon placing at a mine any system cars, if it had its full quota
from assigned cars. Under the rule here assailed, the carrier
is P16hibited from placing at a mine more cars than its pro rata,
even if all sought to be placed are assigned private cars or railway fuel cars. Moreover, the rule here assailed is a uniform rule
governing all carriers without regard to their particular circumstances, whereas the Hocking Valley-Tracr Cases prescribed a
practice for the individual carrier after it had been found, upon
specific inquiry, that the carrier had been guilty of undue discrimnnation."
"All of the plaintiffs42
attack the rule
on the
ground that it is inherently unreasonable.
Some that the
rule involves a taking of property without due process of law The
private car owners urge specifically that the rule is an arbitrary
interference with the use of their own property The railroads
urge especially that the rule is an illegal interference with their
right to manage their own affairs."
But the court by Brandeis, J., held nevertheless
"There is clearly no constitutional obstacle. The rule does not
involve a taking of the property of the private car owner. Congress
could exclude private cars from interstate railroads. Compare
United States v. Delaware & Hudson Co., (1909) 213 U. S. 366,
405, 53 L. Ed., 836, 29 Sup. Ct. 527 And it may prescribe con'ditions on which alone they may be used. See Procter& Gamble
Co. v. Umted States, (1912) 225 U. S. 282, 56 L. Ed. 1091, 32
Sup. Ct. 761, Swift & Co. v. Hocking Valley Ry. Co., (1917) 243
U. S. 281, 61 LEd. 722, 37 Sup. Ct. 287 Limiting their use does
not involve regulation of the coal mining industry. Likewise,
Congress may prescribe how carrier-owned cars shall be used.
The regulation prescribed does not invade the private usiness
affairs of the carrier. It merely limits the use of certain interstate
transportation facilities.
"The main question
is whether Congress has vested in
the Commission authority to prohibit a use of assigned cars by a
general rule.
The legislation to be construed is paragraphs
42"Four of the suits were brought by private car owners. They
illustrate different conditions under which, or different purposes for
which, private cars are so used. The plaintiffs in No. 709 are coal
merchants who operate mines. The plaintiffs in No. 710 are integrated
concerns, which operate mines solely in order to supply coal to their
manufacturing plants. The plaintiffs in No. 711 are by-product coke
concerns, which do not operate any mine. The plaintiff in No. 712 is a
public utility, which does not operate any mine. In each
the cars
owned were acquired, and are used, solely in order to assure transportation of an indispensable supply of coal. The number of coal cars used
on the railroads of the United States is estimated as between 900.000
and 950,000. Ot these about 29,000 are private cars.
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10 to 17, added to section 1 of the Interstate Commerce Act by the
Transportation Act, 1920,"
of which number 12 was mainly involved. 43 The railroads contended that it prescribed a rule complete in itself and that the
Hocking Valley-Traer rule, read as a limitation of the Interstate
Commerce Commission's power. The Commission argued for
"administrative discretion as to how the cars be assigned" and
the court agreed.

44

The decision indicates to what lengths the nondiscrimination idea affects property As in the Spencer Kellogg Case the
property here is not that of the carrier at all. It was dedicated
to use which was part of a general utility business,-transportation-but it was not "dedicated to a public use" in the sense of
Munn v. Illinois.45 Does the decision mean that the utility customer who supplies himself with equipment "devotes" it so that
its use may be regulated on the same principles as is property
Many shippers own, and, under the
"devoted" by the utility
allowances stated, use equipment for the doing of things which
it is the carrier's duty to do. If they are grain elevators as in the
Spencer Kellogg Case,40 they are already public enterprises under
the Mu.n Case and their service rates are regulatable on that
score. In the Sprunt Case,47 the equipment was held not to be
43The provisions of the Commerce Act sec. 1 (12)
et seq.. in
substance, are "It shall be the duty of every carrier by railroad to
among the coal
make just and reasonable distribution of cars
mines served by it
to apply just and reasonable ratings and to
against
count each and every car furnished to or used by any mine
reasonable rules, regtuthe mine." "The commission may establish
"
service
car
to
respect
with
lations, and practices
The fifth suit, No. 606. is brought by owners of railroad fuel cars
including many of the leading bituminous coal carriers of the United
States. Railroad fuel cars are divided according to ownership, into
foreign fuel cars, that is, those which belong to, and are used for the
fuel supply of, a carrier other than the one on whose lines the mine
is located, and home line or system fuel cars, that is, those which are
owned by and are used to supply fuel to, the carrier on whose liles tile
mine is located. Railroad fuel cars are further classified according to
the ownership, use, and character of the mine to which they are assigned that is, whether the cars are used wholly in connection with a
mine not owned by such carrier, but whose whole output is contracted
for by it, or whether the mine at which the cars are to be placed is a
"commercial" one-that is, a mine which supplies coal also to the general public. About 28 per cent. of all bituminous coal mined is cousumed by railroads. The number of the railroads to which the prescribed rule applies is 3,073. Of these, all except the 35 plaintiffs in
No. 606 have acquiesced in the order."
44The case is noted 7 Boston Univ. L. Rev. 300.
45(1876) 94 U. S. 113, 24 L. Ed. 77
4"Ante, p. 110 et seq.
47
Ante, p. 109, 110.
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used in a service which the utility was bound to furnish, but in
the cases where it is so used-as was the drayage equipment of
the uptown compresses-it is in fact so far "devoted" that the
rates are set through the device of the Commission's setting the
allowances. But this does not limit the uptown compresses in
their own use of their own drays. Is it conceivable that if some of
the compresses were short of drays that the others could be ordered
not to use their full equipment, or to apportion some of theirs to
the deficiency? Does the present case go to that?
If in fact there are cars at a time when cars are needed,
it is dear economy to put them to use. That they will not be put
to use is scarcely thinkable. Rental will, of course, be paid for the
use, but the owner's interest is in his use rather than in the rental
for its use by another. The decision is a potential curb on private
car owning.
(d) THE GOVERNMENT IN BUSINESS AND ITS RATES
In favor of charity and in favor of government; the nondiscrimination doctrine has been stretched-from the business viewpoint it seems illogically enough. After judicial decisions which
defeated the protests of other users thereby made to contribute
unwilling doles, 48 the matter has become imbedded in statutory
permissions, both state and federal, allowing the utilities to make
the deductions, and attacks upon these statutes, based on constitutional prohibitions against class legislation, have been unavailing.49 The recipients of the favors give nothing to the utility in
return, and the permissions whether judicial or statutory are
based upon the ever vague "public policy" basis. The federal
government jealously guards its interests from the effects of the
general idea when it is applied in favor of a state 0 but it, itself,
enjoys special consideration in many ways.
4SIn New York Telephone Co. v. Siegel Cooper Co.. (1911) 202 N.
Y. 502, 96 N. E. 109, 36 L. R. A. (N.S.) 560, the charity and city discount
of 25 per cent was held to be within the "exception (which) permits
a reduction where special facts make it reasonable and just." The
reason was that the exception was from time out of mind. It %as here
a voluntary concession by the utility to the municipality in which it
operated
and which regulated it in various ways.
49 See St. Louis, S. W R. Co. v. State, (1924) 113 Tex. 570, 261 S.
W 996, 1924, 33 A. L. R. 367 and State v. Chciago B. & Q. R. Co..
(1924) 112 Neb. 248, 199 N. W 534, noted (1924) Mich. L. Rev. 69.
5Oln Nashville Chattanooga and St. L. Ry. v. Tennessee, (1923)
262 U. S. 318, 43 Sup. Ct. 583, 67 L. Ed. 999, the Supreme Court dealt
with sec. 22 of the Interstate Commerce Act: "Nothing in this act shall
prevent (service) free or at reduced rates for the United States, state or
municipal governments, or for charitable purposes." The state utilities
commission had denied increases on road materials for public high-
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Though, unlike the cases above, the origin of its now preferential treatment is a prior quid pro quo granted by the United
States, its arrangements with the land grant railroads for favors
in the transportation of its munitions and property furnish some
recent decisions on the topic of governmental preference of the
general public.
In Lomusille and Nashzpille R. R. v. Umted States51 the
government claimed the party rate tariff in the first place, and
also that the land grant reductions be applied to it. The court
sustained the claim in full, Sutherland J. saying"It is not disputed that in virtue of valid acts of Congress
appellant's land grant aided lines were bound to carry officers and
men of the army and navy at a rate, in the words of the law, 'not
to exceed fifty per centum of the compensation for such government transportation as shall at that time be charged to and paid
by private parties to any such company for like and similar
transportation
'That the party rates, 2 being open to private
parties, were open to the government, with a deduction of 50
per cent, under this express provision of the statute, does not
admit of doubt."53
ways while increasing rates on other materials sufficiently to conform
to a general increase granted by the Interstate Commerce Commission.
"A lower rate may result in giving to a single quarry within the state
all of the governmental business, so that competing quarries and localities within and without the state (the case was brought on in the
interest of the latter) or interstate traffic would be prejudiced," said the
court in holding the state commission's order void.
51(1926) 273 U. S.321, 47 Sup. Ct. 365, 71 L. Ed. 661.
52
The well known Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baltimore
and Ohio R. R., (1892) 145 U. S. 263, 12 Sup. Ct. 844. 36 L. Ed. 699,
established in 1892 that under the permissions of sec. 22 a railroad violated no prohibitions in allowing party rates. Later cases compelled
continuance of this recognition of the wholesale-transaction-less-unitcost idea, Penna. R. R. v. Towers, (1917) 245 U. S.6. 38 Sup. Ct. 2, 62
L. Ed. 117 as to commuters, but United States v. N. Y. Cent. R. R.,
(1923) 263 U. S. 603, 44 Sup. Ct. 212, 68 L. Ed. 470, put a check on it
in a case in which .the Commerce Commission had read as mandatory
a provision added by Congress for interchangeable mileage coupons
while the court read it as merely an authority to the commission to
order such rates on appropriate fact findings.
In Georgia P S. Comm. v. Atlantic, etc., Ry., (Ga. 1927) 139 S.
E. 725, where the commuter rates already in force were at a loss, the
order for commutation rates to new points was upset as violating due
process, though the Towers case had made it clear that while commuter
rates might not perhaps be ordered in the first place the commissions
could order new ones after the road began them. A note in 14 Va. L.
Rev. 225 considers that the losses in the Georgia case distinguish it
from the federal decisions.
53
In Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States, (D.C. Minn. 1927)
22 F (2d) 858, the railroad carried troops, from St. Paul to Seattle oii
travel orders indicating the shortest route. It had a longer route which
included a greater land grant mileage, and the question was whether
the land grant rate should be claimed as per the higher percentage of
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A suit for government rates on telegrams brings out the
depths of entanglement in which the public preferentials, whether
gratis on public policy grounds or on a paid-in-full-for-all-timeto-come basis, may involve a utility. The case of United States
Shipping Board Corporation v. Western Union"4 came up on
certiorari after a victory by the Telegraph Company '
Saying,
per Brandeis J., that the question was one of statutory constructon,56 the court went on to defeat the utility by its own prior
liberality and to hold it to a figure which is only fifty per cent of
the rate to other users of the telegraph
"Continuously since June 8, 1867, the Western Union has
extended the right
not only to each of the great Executive
Departments presided over by a member of the Cabinet (and to
the several bureaus, divisions, and officers thereof), but also to
the judicial and the legislative branches, to the government of
the District of Columbia, and to the following corporations
existing at the time of the passage of the Post Roads Act.""7
the land grant mileage on the longer route, or as per the percentage
on the route actually traveled. The court denied the government's claim
though it appeared that for forty years its payments had been on the
basis most favonng it.
54(1928) 275 U. S. 415, 48 Sup. Ct. 198. The items were messages by
the Shipping Board to government officers and to private persons, and
among its own agents and officials.
5
5The District of Columbia court of appeals, (1926) 13 F (2d) 308,
relied on Commercial Pacific Cable Co. v. Philippine National Bank,
(D.C.N.Y. 1920) 263 Fed. 218, which denied the special rate to a government owned bank.
56
"By Post Roads Act July 24, 1866, ch. 230, 14 Stat. 221, Rev. Stat.
secs. 5263-5266 (47 U.S.C.A. secs. 1-3, 6, Comp. St. sees. 1072-1075), the
United States offered privileges of great value to any telegraph company which should elect to accept its provisions. In return, it required,
by section 2 of the act (now 47 U.S.C.A. sec. 3 Comp. St. sec. 10075)
'That telegraphic communications between the several departments
of the government of the United States and, their officers and agents
shall, in their transmission over the lines of any of said companies, have
priority over all other business, and shall be sent at rates to be annually
fixed by the postmaster general.' (At the time) they were fixed for domestic telegrams substantially at 40 per cent. of the commercial rate,
and for cablegrams at 50 per cent."
57New departments of the government are constantly added
is
there any time when the utility may cry "enough ?"
The court said: "It is urged that, if the Fleet Corporation is granted the government rate, it may likewise be claimed by every instrumentality of the government. Instrumentalities like the national banks
or the federal reserve banks, in which there are private interests, are
not departments of the government. They are private corporations in
which the government has an interest. The Fleet Corporation is entitled to the government rate, not because it is an instrumentality of
the government, but because it is a department of the .United States
within the meaning of the Post Roads Act. In respect to messages sent,
on the government's business, no distinction can properly be made between those of the Shipping Board and those of the Fleet Corporation."
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as a matter of course.
"The extension
was made
The government rate was applied to all messages sent on official
business of the government and chargeable to any of the departments named, whatever the nature of its organization, whatever
its functions, and whatever the character of the official business.
In extending priority and the lower rates, no distinction has ever
been made between messages sent to persons within the several
departments and those outside."
This last illustrates the weight of the burden in each department
the list of the departments makes an appalling total load.
The formidable expansion of government activity with corresponding increase of service unpaid for at current rate challenges
sympathy both for the Western Union Company"' and for the rest
of us, who, as telegraph users, are thus mulcted an invisible tax
of no little size, and if the decision means, as it seems to mean,
that the Western Union has permanently placed its head in the
lion's mouth, it will pay as government activities rise an utterly
undefinable price for the "privilege of great value" given by the
United States59 so long since.
5
SThe users of the special rate as listed by the court now include
"The Smithsonian Institution, the National Home for Disabled Volunteers, Civil Service Commission, Interstate Commerce Commission,
Bureau of American Republics (now the Pan-American Union), Panama Canal, Federal Reserve Board, Federal Trade Commission, InterAmerican High Commission, United States Section, Bureau of Efficiency, United States Shipping Board, -United States Employees Compensation Commission, United States Tariff Commission, Federal
Board for Vocational Education, Alien Property Custodian. United
States Railroad Administration, War Finance Corporation, United
States Interdepartmental Social Hygiene Board, Railroad Labor Board,
Federal Power Commission, General Accounting Office, Veterans
Bureau. "So far as appears by the record, there has been no denial of
the government rate at any time to any department, office, or division
of the government as organized, except that to the Fleet Corporation
here in question."
59The privileges were: The right to construct, maintain and oper
ate lines of telegraph through and over any portion of the public domain,
over any of the military or post roads, or navigable streams, of the
United States and to take necessary stone, timber, etc. from the public lands.
6OLouisville and Nashville R. R. v. Mottley, (1911) 219 U. S. 467
31 Sup. Ct. 265, 55 L. Ed. 297 denied specific performance of a contract,
made in 1871 in return for a release of liability for personal injury for
an annually renewable life pass. Such passes when issued would be
illegal under the act of Congress (Elkins Act) by reason of their iiot
being paid for in money according to the company s schedule of
rates.
When the principle of this Mottley Case was urged by the Western
Union, that "since Act June 18, 1910
which broadened the scope
of the Act to Regulate Commerce so as to include telegraph conipanies, telegraph rates are no longer a matter of contract they they have
and that any deviation from the lawful rate
the force of law
would involve an undue preference to the government and an unjust
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When a private person gives a lump consideration in return
for future service to be performed without further charge, the
transaction breaks down in the face of the requirements of the
nondiscrimination doctrine, and current rates must be paid for the
service as given.10 This is settled federal doctrine. The policy
would seem to be applicable to utility service to whomsoever
rendered, not only on grounds of equality treatment but of keeping track of the financial structure of the utility A way out
would be to allow the Western Union to settle now, on some
agreed basis, for the prior privileges as was done in the cases
concerning the private persons."'
(e)

GEOGRAPHIC ADVANTAGE AND THE NON-DISCRIMINATION

DOCTRINE

In its war against discrimination regulatory authority has
been called upon not only to combat human elements embodied
in the traditions of free contractual powers and in the business
instinct, but business advantage embodied in geography as well.
That mere distance settles comparative charges the long and short
haul provisions of. modern statutes have denied. Mechanical
jurisprudence has not gone so far. A recent writer62 after noting
the "liberalizing influences" in the present federal acts, says, "that
even in its original form the federal regulation made provision for
situations in which the strict prohibition against a 'greater comfor a shorter distance than for a longer distance'
pensation
would not apply." By section 4 of the Commerce Act the Commission is specifically empowered to permit a lesser charge for a
longer haul though it may not permit a charge which is not
reasonably compensatory for the service performed. Section 3
discrimination against its competitors, the private shipping concerns."
the court simply answered. "It may be doubted whether the prescribed
rule requiring equality of treatment would ever be violated by giving to
the government preferential rates. Compare Nashville, Chattanooga &
St. Louis Ry. v. Tennessee, (1923) 262 U. S. 318, 43 Sup. Ct. 583, 67 L
Ed. 999. But it is a sufficient answer to say that it clearly was not the
intention of Congress by the act of 1910 to abrogate or modify the
scope61or affect the application of the Post Roads Act."
in N. Y. Cent & H. R. R. v. Gray, (1916) 239 U. S. 583, 36 Sup.
Ct. 176, 60 L. Ed. 451, the railroad not only refused the latter transportaton in return for which Gray in 1900 (prior to the statute of the
Mottley Case) had made a map of the road at an agreed price but refused him the price less transportation already had. The fact that the
consideration had a price fixed no doubt made the decision in Gray's
favor62 easier.
Chas. E. Cullen "The Long and Short Haul in Missouri," 13 St.
Louis L. Rev. 13. The earlier part deals with the public psychology
back of the federal Act and its modifications.
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bars the giving of undue or unreasonable preference or advantage
to "any particular locality", and section 13, paragraph 4, proscribes discrimination against interstate commerce in favor of
intrastate. Thus are laid at the commission's feet problems which
may and recently have involved it in infinite intricacies.
Challenged by the handicaps or advantages of geography,
regulation has met its task in various ways. In Sprunt and Son
v. United States,6 3 it did so by juggling shipper's allowances
under an ostensibly uniform rate-by a system of legalized rebating as it were.
In Cincinnat. Northern Ry. Co. v. Public Utilities Commission
of Oho,6 4 Judge Kincade remarked in interpreting a state act
"very similar to the Interstate Commerce Act covering rates
for long and short hauls "
"The case presents an attempt to place a quarry forty-two
miles from market on an equal footing with two other quarries,
one thirteen miles and the other eighteen miles from the same
market, and to do this without doing any injustice to any one.
The mere statement of such a proposition furnishes its own answer, and the answer is that it cannot be accomplished. The reason why agricultural land located near a large market, which
will take and consume the products of the soil, is more valuable
than is land of equal quality, but located farther away from the
market, is because it is easier, quicker, and less expensive to
deliver the product of the land located closer to the market. The
same thing is true with mineral products.
"Neither the Public Utilities Commission nor the courts
can place all property on a common basis, regardless of location,
and accomplish substantial justice in doing so."
Yet though earlier federal authority was mindful of this,"0
Congress in 1925 in the Hoch-Smith Resolution"6 declared that
the Interstate Commerce Commission's "true policy in adjusting
freight rates" is to consider the conditions which at the given
time prevail in our several industries that the commission investigate to determine how far existing rates impose undue burdens
to give undue advantage as between the various parts of the
country and the various classes of traffic and adjust them to a
proper development as a whole."
63(D.C. Tex. 1927) 23 F (2d) 874.
64(Ohio 1927) 158 N. E. 506.
65
In Ashland Fire Brick Case, (1911) 22 I. C. C. 115, and i Inter
state Commerce Commission v. Diffenbaugh, (1911) 222 U. S. 42, 32
Sup. Ct. 22, 56 L. Ed. 83, the commission and the court agreed that
Congress had not sought to equalize economic advantages or marketing

conditions.
66

January 30, 1925.
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The attempt to follow the Resolution has brought to a head
the notable Lake Cargo Coal Rate Controversy The Southern
coal producing field which was producing coal on nonunion
conditions in Kentucky, West Virginia, etc., was absorbing a trade
which on geographical grounds "belonged" to the nearer"7 Northern producers. The matter has several times been before the
Commission whose latest order, dated February 21, 1928,
denying to the Southern carriers permission to make a twenty
cent per ton reduction, has been enjoined by a statutory district
court at the instance of the coal mines of the Southern field in
Anchor Coal Co. v. United States."' And thus the old differential under which the Northern fields were being forced out of the
market is restored.
The long and complicated prior history of the controversy
which the court reviews shows that the Commission had acted
in accordance with what it considered its duty under the resolution.
The Commission itself stated that
"At the time of the original hearings 9 the coal-mining industry in Ohio and Pennsylvania was in a comparatively prosperous condition. Since then 12,000 to 15,000 miners have left the
Ohio mines, there has been a large increase in the number of
vacant houses in the mining communities, and merchants have
large amounts of unpaid accounts upon their books. In the Pittsburgh district miners have been given help in getting transportation to the southern fields, from 1921 to 1925 the number of employees engaged in coal mining, decreased 20 per cent., while em,ployees in-other industries increased. 40 per cent, and the coal
business is in a depressed condition. It does not appear that all
this is due.solely to'the rate adjtistment, but if that adjustment
is improper t is,:our duty to correct it so far as possible, and 'we
inust gve conz~s;ratzi to the conditzans existing in the industry
"
under the provisions of the Hoch-Sinith resolution.
To this the court replied
"But it must be manifest that increasing the differential to
meet such a situation is not regulation of rates, but regulation of
industrial conditions under the guise of regulating rates. It
means nothing more nor less than that, because one community
is able to produce coal more cheaply than another, and thereby
get a large share of the business which has been going to the
other, even though paying a considerable differential in freight,
the Commission is placing upon it a handicap by increasing the
67The advantage of the Northern fields is stated in miles as in the ratio
of one to two. Their distance from the Lake ports is 200, that of the Southern fields is 400 miles.
68(D.C.W Va. 1928) 25 F (2d) 462.
69(1925) 101 I. C. C. 513.
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differential in rates and thereby equalizing the advantage which
it is in essence a regulait has in a low cost of production.
tion of industrial conditions through manipulation of rates,"
and it held that Congress neither meant to nor could empower
the Commission so to do.
The Hoch-Smith Resolution is of vast interest as a possible
foretaste of new policies in positive control of business conditions by public utility regulation. How any such attempt may be
practically effectuated is the nub of the situation. The particular
difficulty recalls the ancient query in catdom "who will bell the
cat'" The idea invites sectional political warfare upon any government agency to which the task of control may be assigned and
in the actual situation the Interstate Commerce Commission was
so far made a target that its prestige has been injured. 0 Yet the
dissatisfaction with the present rate structure of the railroads
viewed as a national system, which was manifested in the debates
upon the resolution, calls for an impartial and scientific study of
the relation of geography to rates, and the Hoch-Smith essay
is, perhaps, a beginning
70When Commissioner Cox's term ran out after he had voted favorably to the southern field, Pennsylvania opposed his reappointment and
moved to replace him with a Pittsburger, whose name the president
did in fact submit. This appointment the senators from the Southern
coal states blocked. Two commissioners, Esch and Aitchison, as it
was asserted, "switched" their votes during the Lake Coal Rate Controversy. The Southern coal states who charged that they (lid so In
fear of the powers in the northern field therefore lay in wait for Esch
at the expiry of his term. His renomination by the president gave them
The Committee on Interstate Commerce voted
their opportunity.
against him and the Senate confirmed the rejection.
Senator Neely of West Virginia who led the fight declared that the
rejection "is very emphatic warning that the Senate will not tolerate
packing
in favor of Pennsylvania, or any other section in
favor of any particular interest in the country." The newspapers say that
another member has announced that he will not accept reappointment.
Thus the Commission is cast into the arena of sectional politics and there
terrorized.
The writer has more fully set out the history of the Hoch-Simth
Resolution and the Commissions tribulations with respect to it in an
article to be published during the 1928-29 school year.

